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With the aim of testing macroprudential policies’ effectiveness, this research models a
rich and open economy hit by future news shocks about fundamentals and regime switches
in global liquidity. Agents take excessive debt to finance current consumption, making the
economy more vulnerable to financial crises. Quantitative findings of the simulation shows
that a tax on debt, optimally set by a social planner, increases total welfare and decreases
the probability and the magnitude of financial crisis. However, it is shown that if news
precision increases too much, a tax on debt may be even deleterious because it reduces
economic growth.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis raised the debate on how policy makers and economists can reduce
the likelihood and magnitude of future crises’ aftermath. As a consequence, a branch of the
literature on macroeconomic dynamics encourages to hamper the systemic risk in the econ-
omy by counter-cyclically adopting macroprudential policies. Some of the most important ones
include: loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, tax on the cost of borrowing, capital buffering, liquidity
requirements and dynamic provisioning.
This work tries to assess the effectiveness of a macroprudential tax on debt within the dynam-
ics of financial crises. In particular, the model is borrowed from Bianchi, Liu and Mendoza
(2015[11]), henceforth BLM. It embraces propagations of shocks through the Fisherian debt-
deflation amplification power. This theory postulates an economy that oscillates between peri-
ods of booms and recessions, according to its degree of leverage. Among other factors, agents
tend to borrow in accordance with their expectation about future wealth and with the degree
of liquidity in the economy (e.g. level of interest rate). The effect of shocks on the probabil-
ity and magnitude of a crisis is directly proportional to the debt outstanding in the economy,
because fragility of the system becomes wider as leverage increases. As advocated in Durdu et
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al. (2013[20]), past research found that rich economies have more debt outstanding than poor
economies in equilibrium. Moreover, credit and consumption growth in poor economies (BLM)
differ with respect to those in rich economies (Baseline model here). As a result, the interesting
challenge I address is to understand how particular macroprudential policy instruments impact
the two different environments.
The economy in this model is characterized by three kinds of shocks: tradable income (denoted
by yTt ), noisy news on fundamentals (st) and interest rate (qt, proxy for global liquidity) shocks.
These circumstances are considered in accordance to existing studies on financial crises: ele-
ments like these are fundamental determinants of credit growth dynamics. Calvo (1996[15])
and Shin (2013[30]) showed the importance of global interest rates and global market status for
capital inflows or domestic credit (Beaudry at al., 2014[3]). Moreover, these shocks can be seen
as unconventional, since the majority of previous quantitative studies focused, for instance, on
standard TFP or exclusively on interest rate shocks (e.g. Mendoza, 2010[10]).
Simply stated, the model describes that once an adverse shock in interest rate hits the economy
or whenever good news about future income are not realized, the severity of the financial crisis
(sharp cut in consumption and capital flows) on the economy increases. To discourage agents’
willingness to over-borrow (pecuniary externality), financial regulators set an optimal1 macro-
prudential tax τ ∗t on the cost of borrowing, which increases the cost of bonds in the agent’s
budget constraint2.
Even if at a lesser extent than BLM, this simulation eventually shows that good news pro-
voke higher mass in the right-tail (i.e. high debt levels) of the distribution of bonds’ holdings
in the economy. My quantitative findings can be summarized into three aspects: firstly, rich
economies experience less frequent, but higher in magnitude, crisis events than poor economies
do. In particular, the economy modeled in this work yields probabilities of facing a crisis of
1.44% and 1.04% with and without macroprudential intervention, respectively, which is trans-
1Optimality of the tax comes from equating the social planner’s Euler equation of bonds and the decentralized
equilibrium with tax.
2In BLM, regulators opt for implementing a tax τt on the cost of borrowing as macroprudential policy because
it is just the debt that causes the pecuniary externality in the model.
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lated into 40 basis points of gain. On the other hand, the BLM economy yields 3.51% and
2.27% with and without the policy, achieving 124 basis points of gain. This may be due to
the higher credit ratings and higher debt outstanding of rich than poor economies; secondly,
as a consequence of the first result, the optimal macroprudential tax on debt in this setting
achieve roughly half the welfare gain achieved in a poor economic setting: 0.066% in this model
and 0.12% in BLM; thirdly, as agents receive more precise news on their future income, social
planner’s intervention becomes less effective, likely because agents are able to better allocate
resources between consumption at t = 0 and bonds at t = 1.
The structure of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 concisely revises recent approaches
on testing macroprudential policies; in section 3, the main model and shocks’ dynamics are
presented; the work proceeds in section 4 with the calibration of parameters and the results
quantitatively developed in MATLAB, including a scenario analysis on news precision. To cal-
culate the effects of the policy, the decentralized equilibrium (DE) scenario is compared with
the Social planner (SP) equilibrium3. A conclusive section closes the work.
2 On testing Macroprudential policies: existing approaches
The existing literature on modeling set of macroprudential policies is still improving. The main
reason behind that is the difficulty in assessing clear interactions between macroeconomics and
financial markets dynamics (Adler, 2014[2]). Hence, these models still rely upon different, but
essential, assumptions. Macroprudential policies have been defined by the ECB Vice-President
Vitor Constâncio as “those maneuvers aiming at preventing and mitigating systemic risk, which
includes strengthening the resilience of the financial system and smoothening the financial cycle,
in order to preserve the effective provision of financial services to the real economy”.
By following a similar approach to Galati et al. (2014[23]), there are two ways for assessing the
effectiveness of macroprudential policies: theoretical and empirical strategies4.
3SP equilibrium is the one including the implementation of a macroprudential tax, τ∗t , on debt
4In order to describe different existing approaches of studies on the effectiveness of macroprudential policies,
Galati et al. (2014[23]) adds “stylized presentations” to the two categories described here.
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2.1 Theoretical methodologies
This category can be divided into two areas: “Banking/finance models” and “Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models”. The former category is based on the state-dependent
structure of assets and contracts (Diamond et al.,1983[17], 2001[18]). Asymmetry of informa-
tion and incentive problems are the basis for possible financial instability in the economy. If on
the one hand these models highlight the convoluted cooperation between lenders and borrowers,
on the other one, they completely ignore the function of timing and business cycle level and usu-
ally entail only partial equilibrium settings (Al-Darwish et al., 2011[1] and Jaffee and Walden,
2011[26]). The latter category, instead, study the need for macroprudential policies resulting
from two sources of failures: the financial amplification mechanism of agents’ over-borrowing
behavior5 or the excessive risk-taking behavior incurred by banks (Kashyap et al., 2014[28]). In
this context, DSGE models are useful for simulating different shocks hitting the economy and
for analyzing the impact of ad-hoc regulatory measures. This category of DSGE models, say
first generation model (D. Adler, 2014[2]), is constructed upon the financial accelerator system
of Bernanke (1999[8]), upon Brunnermeier & Pederson (2009[14]) and upon Graub & Vayanos
(2002). It has to be noticed that first-generation models suffer from two important pitfalls:
firstly, they assume an economy eventually coming back to its steady-state (because of the
log-linearization procedure around the steady-state); secondly, they ignore endogenous shocks.
Therefore, rather than log-linearly approximating around the steady-state, solving the full dy-
namics of the model (allowing outcomes to follow a distribution of events, multiple equilibria) is
the basis of the “second generation models”. He & Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013), Brunnermeier
& Sannikov (2014) and Benigno (2013[4]) are only some of the most important models included
in this category.
This second-generation models are usually established on the "Neo-Fisherian" theory. By em-
bracing the debt-deflation spiral of Irving Fisher theory (1933[21]), when borrowing constraint
binds (naturally during crisis), private agents’ and policymakers’ decisions affect the state of
5Private agents, in fact, neglect the externalities of their sub-optimal actions and measures such as Loan-to-
value ratios, margin requirements on Repos used by shadow banking and liquidity coverage ratios, would avoid
fire sales and credit shrinkages and may improve total welfare.
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the economy (Bianchi et al., 2010[10], Jeanne et al., 2013[27], Benigno et al., 2013[4]). In this
occasion, when eventually state-contingent taxes are adopted by regulators, financial stability
may improve substantially. In Bianchi and Mendoza (2010[10]) for instance, policy makers can
neutralize the credit externality which these models depend on, by imposing status-contingent
average taxes on debt and dividends of about 1% and -0.5%, respectively. This tax is higher
during periods when leverage is building up and the economy is becoming vulnerable to a fi-
nancial crisis. The main idea is that this kind of tax hinders the willingness of private agents
in accumulating precautionary savings. The work described in this research is just on the same
line of the second generation models of the vast “financial frictions” theory.
2.2 Empirical approaches
Because of shortage of available data (as discussed in Galati et al., 2013[22]) and, as mentioned
above, the non-clear establishment in relating the macro economy and financial system, under-
taking empirical approaches on macroprudential effectiveness is still arduous.
The most complete datasets used in empirical studies on macroprudential policies contain data
at international policy level, size and volatility of cross-border borrowing, data about sys-
temically important banks and official surveys (IMF (2011b). The most important datasets
are constructed by Lo (2009), Borio (2010), Federico et al. (2012a) and Brunnermeier et al.
(2014). Once data are collected, empirical approaches still suffer from a typical drawback in
econometrics, namely the complicated matter in identifying causal relationship against correla-
tion. Often, these works are based on linear regression analysis, panel data regression (Kuttner
et al., 2012[29] and Vandenbussche et al., 2015[31]), counterfactual simulations (e.g. Antipa et
al., 2010, Catte et al., 2010, or Barrell et al., 2010) or stress testing (Sorge, 2004, and Borio
and Drehmann, 2009[12]). Different national and supra national banks, such as the ECB or
the Bank of Canada, approach the level of systemic risk in the financial system by adopting
macro stress-testing models. They are naturally forward-looking but generally fail to include
feedback loops between the macroeconomy and the financial sector.
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3 Model
The model is along the same line of the introductory future news about income and shifts in
global liquidity proposed in BLM (2015[11]). The social planner optimization problem needs
to solve the pecuniary externality caused by excessive borrowing of agents.
3.1 Households
In a small and open economy, a representative household maximizes a classical Constant Rel-
ative Risk Aversion (CRRA) intertemporal utility function (or power utility) by choosing to













where β is the subjective discount factor, bounded between 0 and 1, measure of impatience. The
term 1
1+η
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) between tradable and nontradable
goods, ω represents the share of consumption on tradable goods and (1−ω) on nontradable ones,
with 0 < ω < 1,. The term γ represents the coefficient for relative risk aversion, identifying pre-
cautionary savings, namely the aversion to consumption stream that varies over time and across
states of nature. The function u(c), whose curvature allows for risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution, is required to be concave and twice continuously differentiable. Ceteris paribus,
for high levels of γ, IES become smaller and, thus, intertemporal consumption becomes less
substitutable (high γ-individuals want to maintain a smooth inter-temporal consumption pro-
file). By assuming unitary price for tradable goods, i.e. pTt = 1, agents’ maximization problem
described above is subject to the following budget constraint:











where qtbt+1 = bt+1Rt is the total price of bt+1 1-year maturity plain-vanilla bonds. Of course,
shifts in the inflation-adjusted interest rate Rt lead to different states of global liquidity, be-
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cause for higher levels of Rt, the agent faces a tighter budget constraint (he can consume less
in the future). Each period, the representative agent chooses {cTt , cNt , bt+1}t≥0, given a fixed
endowment of bonds, bt, and nontradables, yNt , and given a collection of news on the stochastic
Markov chain process for the endowment of tradables, yTt+k, with k ≥ 1.
In addition, it is necessary to specify the credit constraint that restricts the agent’s amount
of debt to a ceiling, i.e. a fraction κ of his total income. This is typically interpreted as the
institutional frictions by which lenders can curb κ from borrower in case of default:
qtbt+1 ≥ −κ(yt + pNt yNt ) (3)
In order to maximize the CRRA lifetime utility described in 1, the representative agent needs
to choose the optimal amount of stochastic processes {cNt cTt , bt+1}t≥0, subject to his budget






From (4) and taking into account the derivative of c = [ω(cT )−η + (1− ω)(cN)−η]
−1














Et[λt+1 + µt] (6)
while the last optimality condition is:




t ) ≥ 0 (= 0 if µt > 0) (7)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint, (2), and µ is the Lagrangian
multiplier on the credit constraint, (3). It is important to notice how shifts (or shocks) in
gross real interest rate (i.e. changes in global liquidity), 1
qt
, influences borrowing capacities
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through the right side of the agent’s Euler equation (6). It is natural that in a low interest rates
circumstance, borrowing is cheap and agents tend to accumulate more debt. Furthermore, news
about future income, yt+1, affects either borrowing capacity at t = 0 and expectations on future
(t > 0) borrowing. Intuitively, once agents receive positive news about their future income,
their current consumption starts to increase. But, since this future realization is uncertain and
not concrete yet, they incautiously decide to excessively borrow anyway. At the same time,
good news decreases future borrowing’s needs in agents’ budget constraint, by increasing future
borrowing capacity. In the end, the combination of the two eventually alters the stability of
the economy through the financial system, increasing its vulnerability to financial crises.
3.2 Modeling news about future values of tradable income
In this section, the mechanism through which news about future fundamentals values, i.e. future
realizations of yT , is introduced. The approach follows closely Durdu et al. (2013[20]).
The tradable income process is structured as to follow an AR(1) process:
ln(yTt ) = ρln(y
T
t−1) + εt
with E(ε) = 0 and E(ε2) = σ2ε . Moreover, it is assumed that in each period the agent receives
a signal st about 1-period ahead tradable income shock. Because of this predictive power, the
signal will make the agent changing his revision on forecast for next period tradables income.
In particular, the forecast of next period’s tradable income shock (yt+1) is made as such to
incorporate the signal st. In order to develop the stochastic probability process of tradables
income realization only, BLM make use of the Bayes’ theorem, conditional on some values of
current income yTt , and news signal, st, that agents receive in each period:
p(yTt+1 = l|st = i, yTt = j) =
p(sl|yTt+1 = l)p(yTt+1|yt = j)
Σnp(st = i|yTt+1 = n)p(yTt+1|yTt = j)
(8)
For quantitative issues, it is necessary to express the joint Markov process evolution of the
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tradable income, yT , and news signal, s, through the conditional probability Π(·):
Π(yt+1, st+1, yt, st) ≡ p(st+1 = k, yt+1 = l|st = i, yt = j) =
p(yt+1 = l|st = i, yt = j)Σm[p(yt+2 = m|yt+1 = l)p(st+1 = k|yt+2 = m)]
(9)
The function Π(·) (equation 9) transforms signals and income levels at t with the same
equivalent figures at t+1 (expected realization). Once again, it is important that this stochastic
process is known by the agent, who decides in its accordance to create rational expectations on
their future consumption and borrowing decisions’ development6. The values for yT shocks are
discretized through the Tauchen and Hussey’s method7.
Subsequently, it is needed to specify the probability of receiving a public signal given a definite
value l for future income. In other words, signal precision is defined as:
p(st = i|yTt+1 = l) =

θ if i = l
1−θ
N−1 if i 6= l
(10)
where st identifies the news signal that the agent collects at time t whereas N is the number
of states of yTt+1 (with N = 3). The term θ is the precision parameter of the signal: for
θ = 1, the precision of the signal is certain and agent can thoroughly incorporate the future
value yt+1 acting in its accordance. For simple tractability of the model, it is assumed that
even if θ = 1, the agent still faces uncertainty about yt+k, with k ≥ 2. In the real world, of
course, private agents receive many signals likely occurring at different future periods. Then,
for values θ = 1
N
, p(st = i|yTt+1) becomes a uniform probability function because, regardless the




case the agent’s borrowing decision is not influenced, because none of the states of nature for
yTt+1 is overweighted. Furthermore, it is assumed that news signal is publicly available to both
households and regulators. Of particular interest are the cases when signals are very precise
6Only the stochastic process for yTt is present because it is assumed that yNt is taken as given.
7The purpose is to find a Markov chain whose sample paths approximate those of the AR(1) described above.
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(for instance, θ > 0.90), because asymmetry of information may arise. In this regard, as Durdu
et al. (2013[20]) found, one of the differences between emerging and developed economies is in
the degree of precision of news. It is shown (Boz et al., 2011[13], Gelos et al., 2005[24]) that,
differently from poor economies, higher income per capita countries are typically characterized
by relatively accurate information systems. For this purpose, several cases for θ will be presented
in the quantitative section.
3.3 Modeling global shifts in liquidity, R
Global liquidity shocks are considered to allow for exogenous factor hitting the economy.
Regimes of this kind can vary from high to low levels of world real interest rate, which is
used as a proxy for liquidity. For a matter of simplicity however, the process for interest rate
shocks is made standard two-point, transitioning from Rh to Rl. Its properties are:
Transitioning probabilities: Fhh ≡ p(Rt+1 = Rh|Rt = Rh); Fll ≡ p(Rt+1 = Rl|Rt = Rl)
Switching probabilities: Fhl = 1− Fhh and Flh = 1− Fll








Unconditional Variance: σ2(R) = Πh(Rh)2 + Πl(Rl)2 − E[R]2
1st order autocorrelation: ρ(R) = Fll − Fhl = Fhh − Flh
3.4 Regulator’s problem
In the context of shocks hitting the economy, a social planner aims at maximizing either bor-
rowers’ and lenders’ welfare in the market, by containing the frequency and the pecuniary
externalities of the financial crisis. In theoretical terms, the constrained maximization problem
for the social planner involves directly choosing the optimal amount of bonds in the economy
satisfying his credit constraint. This decision is similar to private agent’s, but the regulator
internalizes the effect of borrowing on consumption and on the tightness of the credit constraint
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(3). The regulator’s maximization problem is:




ω(cT )−η + (1− ω)(cN)−η]−
1
η + βEV (b′, z′)
]
(11)
subject to the following resource constraint (12), nontradable market clearing condition (13),
credit constraint (14) and optimal condition for allocation of consumption (15):
cT + qb′ = b+ yT (12)
cN = yN (13)








where the current bond holdings, b, and the actual exogenous shocks, z = (y, s, q), represent








Et[λt+1 + µt] (17)
where λt and µt represents the Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraint (12) and the








represents the effect of cTt on the
level of borrowing capacity and the relative price of nontradables, which in turn affect yT (i.e.
collateral). Thus, the term µtψt in equation (16) identifies the additional benefit of tradable
goods resulting from relaxing the credit constraint.
3.5 Optimal macroprudential tax on debt
The interesting channels through which news about future income and regime shifts in global
liquidity affect the economy are:
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• “Positive news” at period t about future fundamentals (increase in E[yt+1]) lead, on the one
hand, to an increase in current consumption, which must be accompanied by an increase in
borrowing (because yt+1 has not been realized yet) and, on the other hand, to an increase
on expectations for future borrowing capacities, which further reduce future financing
needs. Eventually, this mechanism may result in high levels of financial vulnerability in
the economy.
• Whenever low levels of interest rates characterize the economy, access to borrowing be-
comes easier and, as a result, agents are willing to take more debt. Higher interest rates
may lead to the opposite.
After an unforeseen interest rate increase or8 a negative income disturbance shocking the eco-
nomic system, aggregate consumption shrinks, which in turn leads to a contraction in the credit
constraint and in capital flows. In this regard, intervention by the social planner is needed es-
pecially for hindering this fueling in vulnerability. In fact, as explained in section 2, those
intervening policies aim at reducing the borrowing incentives of agents. They vary from Loan-
to-Value (LTV) ratios to taxes on the cost of borrowing, from capital requirements to reserve
requirements (Galati et al., 2014[23]). The option of a tax on debt causes the first term in the
right-hand of the agent’s budget constraint (2) to become [ qt
(1+τt)
bt+1]. The optimal level of τ ∗t
is set to equate the regulator’s Euler equation of bonds to the decentralized equilibrium level





A tax of zero is implemented when u(ct) > βREu(ct+1), while, more generally, whenever µt > 0,
it can be shown that there exists several taxes level that satisfy the efficient allocation of choices.




The main difference with BLM model is that, instead of calibrating the parameters for a poor
economy, the framework of this work is calibrated for a rich economy. Hence, I calibrate the
economy for OECD countries with the use of data taken from OECD Main Economic Indicator
and World Bank Open Data, while BLM calibrate the model for Argentina. The resulting
parameters are summarized in table 1 and all their calculation methodologies are subsequently
explained in details.




T Rh Rl Fhh Fll
Values 0.91 2 0.35 0.45 0.32 0.67 1 3 1 0.866 0.033 1.0232 0.9865 0.6013 0.3391
Table 1: Estimated parameters to calibrate the baseline model
For a matter of comparison with BLM (2015), the parameter θ is initially set at 2/3, which
corresponds to the midpoint between two extreme events, i.e. 1
N
= 0.33 and 1.
To estimate the value for ω instead, the dichotomy between tradable and nontradable goods
must be taken into account (Duarte et al., 2008[19]). However, by following their definition9,
it has been calculated ω = 0.35, consistently with the literature10.
The next essential parameter to estimate is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and
nontradable goods, i.e. 1
1+η
. Although Bianchi (2011) reported this measure ranging from
0.40 to 0.83 (in the end, BLM (2015) conservatively opt for 0.83), existing studies do not
focus on developed countries and exclude data series covering the recent financial crisis. Thus,
by means of dataset from OECD Main Economic Indicator and World Bank Open Data on
27 developed countries11, two approaches to estimate the elasticity of substitution between
9According to the OECD, services include transport (both freight and passengers), travel, communications
services (postal, telephone, satellite, etc.), construction services, insurance and financial services, computer
and information services, royalties and license fees, other business services (merchanting, operational leasing,
technical and professional services, etc.), cultural and recreational services, and government services not included
in the list above.
10e.g. in BLM (2015) ω = 0.32, in Stockman and Teaser (1995) and in Dotsey and Duarte (2008), ω = 0.44
11The 27 considered countries are: AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CZE, DNK, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN, IRL,
ITA, LUX, NLD, NZL, NOR, POL, SVK, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR, USA, SVN, LVA and EST.
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tradable and nontradable goods are followed in this research: Lorenzo, Aboal and Osimani
(2004) and Stockman and Tesar (1995). The former starts the estimation from (4) and takes






















After taking logarithms to both sides, the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-










1+η , α1 ≡ 11+η and RER ≡
ptT
ptN
. Estimated coefficients for α1 ≡ 11+η were
weighted by means of the size of the country (i.e. GDP per capita). Eventually, the weighted
average elasticity of substitution measure for OECD countries results to be 0.6167, correspond-
ing to a value for η of 0.6215.
The latter approach is in turn based on Kravis and Robert E.Lipsey (1987) method and con-
siders the seven largest industrial countries using data from OECD datasets (their estimated
value for 1/(1+η) is 0.44). By means of the same dataset, the approach to estimate η is based
on regressing nontradable goods consumption share on the price index for nontradable goods
share and, to control for the income effect, on GDP per capita. Of course, the most striking
figure to estimate is the relative price of nontradables with respect to tradables, PN/P T . But,
by following M.Goldstein and L.H.Officer (1979[25]), it may be proxied by CPI/WPI12. After
weighting for each country’s GDP per capita, the second estimate for the coefficient η is 0.2826,
resulting into a measure for the elasticity of substitution of 0.7797. In summary, the resulting
estimated values for η are therefore 0.6215 and 0.2826, which in turn lead to estimated values
12Consumer Price Index and Wholesale Price Index
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for the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods in rich economies of
0.6167 and 0.7797, respectively, in line with the literature13. To calibrate the model in this







= 0.69. Moreover, by means of the same dataset, I estimate values for
the standard deviation and the autocorrelation coefficient of tradable goods: σyT = 0.033 and
ρyT = 0.866. Subsequently, the value for γ is set at 2, as usual in the literature, and for κ at
0.32, consistently with Bianchi (2011) and to generate a probability of crisis of 3%.
Figure 1: European levels of liquidity, i.e. Net Real interest rate, over the sample period
1986-2017.
In figure 1, it is possible to see the monthly evolution of real LIBOR for the period I/1986-
I/2017. By identifying the global liquidity phase of Calvo et al. (1996[15]) in the first half of
the last decade of twentieth century and other two of Shin (2013[30]) in the first half of the first
and second decade of the twenty-first century, average Rh and Rl are estimated to be 1.0232
and 0.9865, respectively. For the estimation of F hh and F ll instead, since the last phase of
global liquidity occurred as a consequence of the unconventional policies aimed at restoring the
majority of developed economies from the recent financial crisis, I ignored the first years after
the financial crisis (second phase of Shin, 2013[30]). During the other two liquidity phases (the
one of Calvo and the first of Shin), the perpetuation of Rh and Rl resulted to be moderate,
leading to annual frequency for the two regimes of F hh = 0.6013 and F ll = 0.3391.
13e.g. Mendoza (1995), i.e. 0.74
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4.2 Results
The model is backward solved with Matlab using the recursive-substitution method for the
model’s optimality conditions. After finding the decentralized equilibrium (DE) and the optimal
tax solution set by the social planner (SP), the model simulates 201,000 periods, where the first
1,000 serve for training purposes.
The effects of the optimal macroprudential tax set by the social planner on both the economy
modeled in this work (baseline column) and the BLM economy (BLM column), which lead to
moments of the financial crisis, are shown in table 2. The model defines the financial crisis such
as all the periods in which the current account (CA/Y) value varies more than two standard
deviation from what the DE predicts. Welfare gain instead is calculated as to fill the difference
in consumption that equates the decentralized equilibrium (DE) and the social planner (SP)
equilibrium welfare.
Baseline BLM
Moments DE SP DE SP
Long-term moments
E[NFA/Y ]% -31.00 -30.97 -29.62 -29.31
σCA/Y % 2.73 2.02 3.18 1.75
Welfare Gain % n/a 0.0658 n/a 0.12
Prob of crisis % 1.44 1.04 3.51 2.27
Financial crisis moments
∆C% -13.76 -11.24 -14.39 -9.41
∆RER% -43.35 -34.47 -45.55 -27.62
∆CA/Y% 14.05 10.79 13.47 7.06
ΩC 18.10 14.37 4.63 3.25
ΩRER 22.30 17.12 5.61 3.69
ΩCA/Y % 13.95 10.74 13.37 7.38
E[τ ] pre-crisis % n/a 1.037 n/a 4.65
Switch from Rl to Rh
∆C% -13.38 -10.94 -15.49 -10.18
∆RER% -41.95 -33.40 -49.93 -30.25
∆CA/Y% 13.03 9.88 14.65 7.7
E[τ ] pre-crisis % n/a 1.034 n/a 5.11
Table 2: Comparison between moments of the two models, baseline (rich) and BLM (poor)
economy, across DE and SP equilibrium.
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The most important feature macroprudential regulation must aim for is controlling the
credit allocations in “good states” because of their negative externalities flowing into future “bad
states”. The economic intuition behind macroprudential policies operation is just hampering the
fueling of systemic risk, generally approximated by the amount of leverage in the economy, likely
in booming periods. In fact, when the economy is expanding (booming of credit, beginning of
investments, etc.) it is difficult to on-going identify precisely the period when its peak is reached.
Therefore, it is better to inhibit either the vulnerability (probability) and the consequences
(magnitude) of the crisis by just monitoring some macro-signals. This preventive power is
reflected in the decline in the magnitude (∆C%, ∆RER% and ∆CA/Y%) and probability
(from 1.44% to 1.04%, a reduction of only 40 basis points) of crisis in developed economies,
in line with Bianchi et al. (2011 and 2015). These figures, however, are much more contained
in the baseline than in the BLM economy. Probability of crisis under the SP equilibrium is
decreased in BLM by 124 basis points, whereas in the Baseline model by only 40 basis points.
The analytical reason is that optimal taxes of the former (1.037% and 1.034%) are lower than
the ones in the latter (4.65% and 5.11%). Moreover, from an economic standpoint, these
findings are supported by previous studies (Uribe and Yue (2006), Neumeyer and Perri (2005),
Reinhart et al. (2003)) which showed that crises are more likely to occur in poor economies,
because they are characterized by higher interest rate spreads and can only sustain lower debt-
output ratios than rich economies. Furthermore, low income-per-capita countries experience
countercyclical trade balances and sovereign interest rate spreads more frequently than high
income-per-capita countries, which worsen the condition of borrowing in bad times. As a result,
although still positive and preventive, the effect of the optimal macroprudential tax on debt on
crisis dynamics is curbed in rich economies. Moreover, with the adoption of the macroprudential
tax, the long-term average of the net foreign asset position-to-GDP (E[NFA/Y ]) ratio decreases
proportionally less than the volatility of the current account-to-output ratio (σCA/Y ) does. For
a matter of comparison, either poor and rich economies are characterized by about the same
mean of debt ratios with and without the tax, while the BLM economy experiences stronger
decline in variability of capital flows (from 3.18% to 1.75%), in line with Bianchi et al. (2011[9],
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2015[11]). Interestingly to notice is the NFA-GDP ratio: in equilibrium, it is slightly higher in
rich economies (-31 in DE and -30.97 in SP) than in poor economies (-29.62 in DE and -29.31 in
SP). Welfare gain in BLM (0.12%) doubles the one in this model (0.0658%), fact that strengthen
the same thesis. Another difference between the dynamics of the financial crisis in the baseline
model and the BLM model is shown in the bottom part of table 2, where the effects of changes
in liquidity regimes are presented: while the BLM economy experiences a more intense crisis
event in this case than in the previous case (compared to the BLM economy, ∆C, ∆RER and
∆CA/Y are sharper here than in crisis caused by news on fundamentals), the effects in the
rich economy are the opposite (∆C, ∆RER and ∆CA/Y are more contained). In practice, it
seems that the adoption of different macroprudential policies in different scenarios is advised
depending on the characteristics of the economy (e.g. emerging vs. developed economies).
(a) Real Exchange Rate (b) Tradable consumption
(a) Bond holdings (b) Current account-to-GDP ratio
Figure 3: Plots of the main macro variables’ dynamics, around crisis, in the DE and SP setting.
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Macro variables’ dynamics around the crisis event (deviations from the average) across seven
periods (t=7) are shown in figures 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b. From their analysis, it is even more evident
the little positive contribution of the macroprudential tax on debt in reducing the magnitude
of drops in consumption, real exchange rate and current account-GDP ratio in the modeled
economy. Lastly, values of financial amplification terms (Ωi, with i=C, RER and CA/Y) are
substantially high in the Baseline model14. This suggests that in rich economies, the effects
of shocks on the main variables are larger in financial crises than in non-crisis events. This is
confirmed also by the modeled Fisherian mechanism of Mendoza et al. (2010[10]).
Figure 4: Distribution of bond holdings.
Although similar to the case of the poor economy (BLM), the benefits of the intervention of
the social planner on the overborrowing tendency of the economy in DE are less accentuated in a
rich economy framework (Baseline). This is reflected in figure 2: as expected, the bond holdings’
distribution under the SP is shifted to the right. Hence, agents’ overborrowing behavior is
corrected. To conclude, the macroprudential tax on debt is more effective in poor economies
14All kinds of Ω work as financial amplification parameters that identify the ratio between average effects of
each variable in financial crisis over the same variable’s impact in normal times.
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than in rich ones since the latter achieves roughly double the welfare gain (0.12% vs. 0.0658%)
and cuts the probability of crisis three times less (124 vs. 40 basis points) than the former.
4.3 Scenario Analysis on news precision
In order to better understand what policy makers can do for limiting the pecuniary externalities
caused by financial crises, it is interesting to look at the evolution of financial crisis moments as
the precision of news, θ, varies. Firstly, by increasing the degree of news precision, the attention
seems to shift on economies with more reliable information distribution system (Boz et al. 2011
[13], Gelos and Wei (2005)[24]). Intuitively, as the precision of news becomes higher, agents
are able to better deal with the allocation of debt to finance current consumption and, as a
result, the probability of crisis is lower. This intuition is replicated into facts: the output of
the scenario analysis on θ, the news’ precision parameter, is shown in the figure below:
Figure 5: Effects of news precision on four macro variables: ∆σ(CA/Y )%, ∆E[NFA/Y ],
∆P (Crisis)% and Welfare % (differences are calculated as ∆X = XDE −XSP ).
For example, the variable Dsigma, which identifies the difference between σCA/Y in DE and
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in SP, decreases as θ increases. This means that, with the macroprudential tax on debt, the
variability of current account of the economy improves less as agents receive more precise news
about their future income. Furthermore, welfare gains decrease and the magnitude of the crisis’
effects, i.e. E[NFA/Y ]%, slowly increases. However, the behavior of drops in probability of
crisis’ figure is not monotonous: for θ < 0.85, it shows a decreasing trend, suggesting that
macroprudential policy looses efficiency in richer economies (at θ = 0.85, SP intervention is
even deleterious). After this threshold however, the gap between probability of crisis in DE
and SP started to increase steadily, meaning that macroprudential tax on debt does properly
its job, namely decreasing the likelihood to experience a financial crisis.
The large majority of these results suggest that a macroprudential tax on debt negatively
affects an economy in which agents can (almost) perfectly anticipate income shocks by relying
on roughly precise news. This is in line with Benigno et al. (2013[4, 5]), who criticized the fact
that macroprudential policies reduce growth (negative welfare), especially in rich economies.
In these special situations indeed, it may be advised to adopt and coordinate macroprudential
policies with either monetary and fiscal policies.
5 Conclusion
Financial crisis dynamics are difficult to inhibit and are different depending on particular coun-
try’s characteristics. There is no universal way for policy makers to prevent such events. By
comparing the beneficiary effects of a macroprudential tax on debt in this model’s setting (cal-
ibration made with OECD data) with a poor economy’s (BLM uses Argentinian data), it is
shown that the effectiveness of the social planner intervention is higher in the latter than in the
former. In particular, welfare gains in rich economies are halved, drop in probability of crisis
goes from 124 basis points to 40 basis points and since the crisis is less likely, macroprudential
tax on debt is slightly higher than 1% only (whereas on BLM is around 5%). Then, as a result
of news precision analysis, my findings show that a macroprudential tax on debt may become
even deleterious as the precision of news on future income received by agents increases. Char-
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acterized by different levels of liquidity, tradable income development and allocation between
tradable and nontradable goods among others, agents in rich economies can rely on better
information flow systems. This is the main reason why financial crises caused by fundamen-
tal news shocks are less likely to occur in developed than in poor economies (BLM). This is
in accordance with previous researches, which showed that poor economies are characterized
by higher interest rate spreads and they can only sustain lower debt-output ratios than rich
economies. In the end, we can conclude that debt outstanding in the economy is a crucial driver
for financial crises. Research on optimal implementation of macroprudential policies is still far
from ideal and needs further improvement.
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